The Anthropocene Turning Point : A New Historicity of Social Relations by Eric MACÉ
The Anthropocene Turning Point : A New













 − 43 − 
The Anthropocene Turning Point:  





Research Department CHANGES - Social Sciences of Contemporary Change 
University of Bordeaux (France) 
 
Abstract  
The historical turning point evidenced by the Covid-19 crisis should now lead to a 
proper name being given to the notion of ‘second modernity’ which, up to the 
present time, has been defined only in relation to the ‘first modernity. Here, we put 
forward the thesis that this new definition be the anthropocene, so that following 
the ‘sociology of modernity’, a ‘sociology of anthropocene’ may become the new 
framework for analyzing the historicity of contemporary social relations. 
 





The Covid-19 pandemic is often presented as a historic turning point: that of a 
worldwide warning of a new type of crisis that humanity will now have to face, i.e., 
the potentially catastrophic globalized effects of environmental change and its 
health, economic, social, geopolitical and psychological consequences. In this 
article, I propose to take this historical dimension of the event seriously by 
inscribing it in an epistemological reflection on the notion of historicity in 
sociological reasoning. My thesis is as follows: the historical turning point 
evidenced by the Covid-19 crisis should lead to the notion of ‘second modernity’, 
which until now has been defined only in relation to the ‘first modernity’, being 
recognized as a distinct era with a distinct proper name. I would like to put forward 
that this new definition be the anthropocene, so that following the ‘sociology of 
modernity’ a ‘sociology of anthropocene’ may become the new framework for 
analyzing the historicity of contemporary social relations. 
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I borrow the concept of historicity from Alain Touraine (1977), who contrasted it 
with the notion of historicism. While most classical and Marxist sociological 
theories are evolutionary and place human societies within history, Touraine 
proposed, on the contrary, to situate history within societies, at the heart of the 
dynamics of social relations and social change. This is why, instead of describing 
modern society as a capitalist society animated by class struggle, or as a 
modernizing nation-state, Touraine defined modern society by the singular 
historicity of the social relations peculiar to the industrial society: that of a central 
conflict between employers and workers movements surrounding the orientation of 
‘progress’ of modernization (Touraine 1981).  
 
Even if Touraine's approach remained Western-centric, it seems to me that the 
notion of historicity is productive for an analogous description of the specific 
dynamics of social relations in the anthropocene era. In other words, it can be 
hypothesized that the central conflict that animates contemporary social relations 
opposes the exclusive and hierarchical forms of solidarity inherited from the first 
modernity with the more inclusive and egalitarian forms of solidarity constructed 
in the ordeal of environmental catastrophe. 
 
2. Crisis of modernity, crisis of modern sociology 
 
In order to propose a new historicity as the object of a sociology of anthropocene, 
it is necessary to review previous discussions concerning notions of modernity, 
crisis of modernity and critique of modernity.  
 
Modernity is inseparably the practice and narrative of a set of ruptures and 
dissociations (Eisentadt 1966; Parsons 1951; Touraine 1995). It is the break with 
the traditional past, the end of the cosmological unity of the world (secularization), 
the dissociation and autonomy of the logics of action (science, economics, politics, 
art), the separation of culture from nature. But it is also a definition of time 
considered as ‘progress’, a definition of space considered as an ‘outside’ to be 
conquered, a definition of action and of the individual defined by autonomy.  
 
This narrative of modernity, however, was challenged by numerous observations 
and criticisms. Feminist critiques of an androcentric definition of autonomy, at the 
price of women's subordination (Tronto 1993). Anticolonial, postcolonial and 
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decolonial critiques of a western-centric definition of modernization, progress, 
autonomy and universalism, at the price of denying, disqualifying, racializing, 
subordinating ‘others’ (Bhambra 2007). Environmentalist critiques of the ‘damage 
of progress’, with the increasing number of industrial accidents and environmental 
degradations at all levels of scale (Beck 1992). 
 
This crisis of modernity led to a first theorization, that of ‘postmodernity’ 
(Lyotard 1977). According to this approach, as this Western-centric modernity of 
instrumental rationality and its great narrative become exhausted, the modern 
parenthesis would close and give way to a postmodern historical moment, 
allowing the diverse mosaic of singularities and narratives to unfold.  
 
However, the globalized dimension of the crisis of modernity quickly led to a need 
to close this theoretical parenthesis of postmodernity. As Antony Giddens (1990) 
and Ulrich Beck (1992) point out, we cannot escape from modernity because 
modernity has totally shaped the contemporary world, so that it is the 
“consequences of modernity” that rather define the contemporary moment. 
However, the analysis of these consequences of modernity is itself the result of a 
conflict of definition. 
 
First of all in a modern way: on the one hand, there was the pessimism inherited 
from Max Weber and radicalized by the Frankfurt school, diagnosing a modernity 
as leading to the destruction of humanity, because this modernity, reduced to 
instrumental rationality, had become like “a runaway engine of enormous power 
which threatens to rush out of control” (Giddens 1990: 139). On the other hand, 
there was the optimism inherited from techno-scientific positivism and the creative 
destruction of capitalism defending the idea of a hypermodernity capable of solving 
the problems of modernity by taking even more technological risks while 
continuing to transfer these risks to ‘others’ (Beck 1992). 
  
Yet, it is the illusory nature of this hypermodern solution to the problems of 
modernity that Ulrich Beck and Antony Giddens emphasize with the concept of 
‘reflexive second modernity’ (Beck, Giddens and Lash 1994). Modernity was seen 
in itself as an ultimate and universal historical stage of human development. In 
retrospect, however, we must consider that this modernity built by the West between 
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the sixteenth and twentieth centuries was only a ‘first modernity’, and that the 
contemporary moment is that of a doubly reflexive ‘second modernity’.  
 
This second modernity involves on the one hand a mechanical reflexivity in the 
sense that it is defined by boomerang effects of all the actions that were done or 
not done during the first modernity and that potentially led to the planetary 
catastrophe. In this sense, while the central time of the first modernity was a future 
mobilizing a present that broke with the past, the central time of the second 
modernity is a present that is the consequence of the past and whose uncertain 
future is conditioned by present actions and inactions. In the same way, whereas 
the first modernity thought it had an exterior to conquer, to exploit, or to transfer 
risks to, the second modernity no longer has an exterior because the boomerang 
effects are now globalized in an accelerated manner (Mcneil 2014).  
 
On the other hand, this reflexivity of the second modernity is also defined by its 
critical dimension; indeed, the second modernity can no longer develop the 
program of ‘progress’, ‘growth’ and ‘development’ in a positivist manner, because 
the risks and uncertainties concerning the future are such that it is necessary to 
totally redefine the relationship of humanity to its environment and to its very 
conditions of existence as a species.  
 
From this standpoint, the notion of ‘compressed modernity’ as it has been developed, 
especially in Asia (Chang 1998), does not replace the notion of second modernity. 
It rather describes the accelerated pace of modernization in the Global South and in 
Asia since the imposition of the first modernity by the colonial or imperialist 
Western relationship. Indeed, the notion of second modernity is less a chronological 
moment or a situated (Western) type of modernity, than a reflexive way of thinking 
about the crisis of modernity and its new planetary stakes. In this sense, the specific 
experience of a compressed modernity is part of a second modernity common to all 
contemporary experiences. 
 
3. From the sociology of modernity to the sociology of anthropocene 
 
This, then, is why it seems to me that this second reflexive modernity can not only 
be defined sociologically in relation to the first modernity – which is 
unsurpassable – but can now be defined in itself, that is, by having its own 
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framework of historicity. It seems to me that the notion of ‘anthropocene’ best 
describes this new historicity. 
  
In order to make a properly sociological use of this notion, the geological 
misinterpretation must first of all be set aside. Indeed, the contemporary moment 
undoubtedly has an effect on the climate of the planet, but it has no effect on the 
planet itself which is not threatened by disappearance or transformations of a 
geological scale. Rather, the focus should be on the effects of human actions and 
inactions on the living conditions of humans and associated species (Latour 2017). 
In any case, it is indeed the existence and action of humans and the ‘great 
acceleration’ of these effects on a planetary rather than a global scale that is at 
issue, so that this is indeed a historical moment in which humanity (anthropos) is 
the central actor (Chakrabarty 2009). Moreover, if we wish to pursue a reasoning 
specific to the social sciences, we should think about these actions and inactions 
in terms of social relations.  
 
This is why the ‘plantationocene’ proposal put forward by postcolonial criticism 
is important: it insists on the early globalization, via the colonial relationship from 
the end of the fifteenth century onwards, of an extractivist relationship to the 
environment with no consideration for humans and non-humans outside Europe 
(Haraway 2016; Moore et al. 2019). This is why the notion of ‘capitalocene’ is 
also important, underlining the particularly central role of capitalism in the 
exploitation and destruction of humans and non-humans (Moore 2016). But these 
two notions are only partial: the colonial relationship was built before capitalism 
(the latter can even be considered as having been made possible by the colonial 
relationship) and extractivist exploitation was achieved as much by capitalism as 
by socialist models of modernization. This is why the more general notion of 
anthropocene is preferable in that it includes, since the first modernity, the 
colonial plantation economy and the capitalist and socialist extractivism, as well 
as the consequences and feedback effects of these developments that characterize 
the second modernity.  
 
However, this new historicity has yet to be defined in such a way as to provide 
the framework for a ‘sociology of anthropocene’, just as classical sociology had 
defined itself as a ‘sociology of modernity’. From this perspective, there is no 
need to invent a new social science, but rather to extend the capacity of 
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sociology to describe, understand and explain much broader and more entangled 
relationships than the thinking of classical sociology of modernity. It is this idea 
of an ‘augmented sociology’ (Macé 2020) that I will now describe, starting from 
the classical sociological notions of interdependence and solidarity. These two 
notions are the basis of social science reasoning: since it is human nature to be 
relational beings, it can be argued that there is no reality for humans other than 
that constructed, instituted and transformed by the totality of relationships 
between beings – in other words, by social relations.  
 
What the anthropocene concept emphasizes is that these interdependencies are 
not reduced to relationships between humans by defining a ‘social’ separate from 
‘nature’ and limited by national boundaries, but that these de facto 
interdependencies are global in scale and include nonhumans, so that an 
augmented sociological reasoning must be extended to take account of these 
broader interdependencies (Latour 2005). It is in this sense that Bruno Latour 
(1993) reminds us that, despite the narratives of modernity, “we have never been 
modern”, in that these interdependencies have always existed, even when 
modernity intended to free itself from them in the name of modernizing 
autonomy, and that it is now the feedback from and awareness of these broader 
interdependencies that feed contemporary reflexivity.  
 
This is what Joan Tronto (1993) points out when she discusses the typically 
modern notion of autonomy: while this notion was at the heart of modern 
capacity for action through scientific and technical, political, artistic, and 
economic conquests, it was illusory as it obscured its necessary condition: the 
non-autonomy and subordination of all those who, through their invisible or 
disqualified work (women, the colonized, the working poor, non-humans), 
enabled the autonomy of some. Thus, taking into account interdependencies in 
the anthropocene framework means no longer placing the notion of autono my 
at the center of reasoning but that of care and vulnerability – not only that of 
the weakest but that of each person throughout his or her life and of everyone 
on a global scale. 
 
This is why the notion of anthropocene also makes it possible to update the notion 
of solidarity, which should be understood in the broad sense as the ways in which 
humans construct and institute the social organization of their interdependencies. 
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More precisely, this notion of solidarity must nowadays be understood as a central 
issue of contemporary historicity, whether solidarities respond to vulnerabilities 
through inclusive policies of care or through exclusive policies of autonomy 
inherited from the first modernity. 
 
This tension between care and autonomy primarily concerns sociological theory 
because, by opposing traditional and modern forms of solidarity, classical 
sociologists have included this notion in a doubly reductive evolutionary reasoning, 
typical of what Beck (2007) refers to as ‘methodological nationalism’.  
 
Firstly, by legitimizing the colonial and racial narrative of modernity, where the 
demonstration of difference from others led to the establishment of a hierarchy. 
This gave rise to colonial and postcolonial narratives based on notions of 
‘modernization’ and ‘level of development’ and contributed to the globalization 
of a mode of growth that destroyed living conditions (Bhambra 2007). By hiding 
this double colonial and extractivist dimension of empires, this reasoning was also 
reductive in that it reduced the notion of solidarity to that of society, understood 
as a social system instituted within the framework of modern (i.e., Western) 
nation-states. Classical modern sociology has thus arbitrarily dissociated the 
academic field into the ‘science of society’ for domestic use and ‘international 
relations’, thus making it very difficult for sociology to think about the 
globalization of social relations (Mann 1987). 
  
Secondly, this focus on the notion of society was linked to an overly integrated 
and inclusive conception of society as a social system based on institutions of 
control and reproduction. This focus on control and domination to define forms 
of solidarity is, moreover, strange for a discipline born out of an original concern 
about the meanings of the revolutionary upheavals of early modernity (Abbott 
2016). And this seems all the more irrelevant today, as the era is once again one 
of anxiety over changes of an unprecedented magnitude.  
 
It is true, however, that social actors do not stop talking about society, either to 
express their desire to make society or, conversely, to denounce society as 
domination. This is why it seems to me that from now on, sociology must be able 
to return the notion of society to the actors and think rather about the forms of 
social organization in terms of configuration. That is, in the sense of Norbert Elias 
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(1978), without prejudging the coherence or even the justice of these forms of 
organization of solidarity, to be able to describe, in the ‘glocalized’ tangle of levels 
of scale and relations between humans and non-humans, the logics of action, 
rationalities, representations and power relations that tend towards more or less 




It is here, it seems to me, that the notion of historicity specific to the anthropocene 
is situated, that is, the conflicting definition of the real and the logics of action 
that flow from it. What this historical turning point shows us is that the object of 
sociology is not society or modernity – unless we resign ourselves to a western-
centric and provincial definition of sociology (Go 2016). The object of sociology 
is more fundamentally the construction, institution and transformation of reality 
through social relationships. This reality was the reality of the first modernity, and 
the historicity of social relations specific to the modernization of industrial 
societies, colonial empires and the globalization of capitalism has built both the 
autonomy of some and the vulnerability of all. In contemporary anthropocene 
historicity, sociology must be able to describe the dynamics of the actors and 
social relations that construct a reality which, exposed to the potential chaos of 
boomerang effects, balances between the exclusive action logics of 
(hyper)modernization and the inclusive action logics of care. From this point of 
view, our relationship to the Covid-19 virus can be interpreted in two different 
ways. On the one hand, in a ‘first modernity’ style, as a war that would have to be 
fought against an outside enemy. On the other hand, in an anthropocene way, as a 
sign of a paradox: this virus, which is the product of the negative anthropization 
of the world, reveals that it is humanity itself that behaves like a virus towards its 
environment, at the risk of destroying that environment and disappearing with it.  
 
To conclude, the classical issues of sociology – identifications, norms, inequalities, 
power, rationalities, conflicts, social relations – do not disappear: they are part of 
a new historicity that is no longer that of the modern, west-centric, national and 
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